KEPEMILIKAN MANAJERIAL DAN KEBIJAKAN UTANG SEBAGAI SUBSTITUSI DALAM MENGONTROL FREE CASH FLOW AGENCY PROBLEM
| Main Authors: | , Anita Akhirruddin, , Jogiyanto Hartono M., Prof. Dr., MBA. |
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| Format: | Thesis NonPeerReviewed |
| Terbitan: |
[Yogyakarta] : Universitas Gadjah Mada
, 2011
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: |
https://repository.ugm.ac.id/89213/ http://etd.ugm.ac.id/index.php?mod=penelitian_detail&sub=PenelitianDetail&act=view&typ=html&buku_id=51535 |
Daftar Isi:
- This research is aimed at testing the influence of free cash flow agency problem on company�s performance which is moderated by managerial ownership and debt policy as a mechanism to reduce free cash flow agency problem. Free cash flow is one of conflict sources between manager and shareholders, in which manager issues the expenses with negative NPV. Conflict interest between shareholders and manager will arise especially when a company has high free cash flow and low growth. The research is also testing the substitutive relationship between managerial ownership and debt policy as a mechanism to the agent conflict control between manager and shareholders The sample used were nonbanking data which were listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange from the period 2004-2009. The samples were selected based on purposive sampling with 390 samples. This research used Three Least Stage Square to test the simultaneous relationship between both mechanisms. To test free cash flow agency problem on the working performance which was moderated by managerial ownership and debt policy, the researcher regression effect model. The result of research show that free cash flow agency problem had indicated negative and significant influence on company�s performance (Tobin�s q). managerial ownership could reduce negative influence of free cash flow agency problem on the company�s performance. This was due to substitutive relationship between managerial ownership with debt policy.