Machine-Learning Attacks on PolyPUFs, OB-PUFs, RPUFs, LHS-PUFs, and PUF–FSMs
| Main Author: | Delvaux, Jeroen |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Terbitan: |
, 2019
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: |
https://zenodo.org/record/2641873 |
Daftar Isi:
- A physically unclonable function (PUF) is a circuit of which the input–output behavior is designed to be sensitive to the random variations of its manufacturing process. This building block hence facilitates the authentication of any given device in a population of identically laid-out silicon chips, similar to the biometric authentication of a human. The focus and novelty of this work is the development of efficient impersonation attacks on the following five Arbiter PUF–based authentication protocols: (1) the so-called PolyPUF protocol of Konigsmark, Chen, and Wong, as published in the IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems in 2016, (2) the socalled OB-PUF protocol of Gao, Li, Ma, Al-Sarawi, Kavehei, Abbott, and Ranasinghe, as presented at the IEEE conference PerCom 2016, (3) the so-called RPUF protocol of Ye, Hu, and Li, as presented at the IEEE conference AsianHOST 2016, (4) the socalled LHS-PUF protocol of Idriss and Bayoumi, as presented at the IEEE conference RFID-TA 2017, and (5) the so-called PUF– FSM protocol of Gao, Ma, Al-Sarawi, Abbott, and Ranasinghe, as published in the IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems in 2018. The common flaw of all five designs is that the use of lightweight obfuscation logic provides insufficient protection against machine-learning attacks.