DAMPAK GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TERHADAP KINERJA PERBANKAN: MARKET RISK SEBAGAI INTERVENING
| Main Author: | sparta, sparta |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article PeerReviewed Book |
| Bahasa: | eng |
| Terbitan: |
UPN Jakarta
, 2020
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: |
http://repository.ibs.ac.id/1774/1/dampak%20GCG%20terhadap%20kinerja%20keuangan%20perbankan-Market%20riks%20sbg%20variabel%20intervening-sparta.pdf http://repository.ibs.ac.id/1774/7/email%20diterimanya%20tulisannya%20dar%20jurnal%20equity.pdf http://repository.ibs.ac.id/1774/8/Surat%20tugas%20033F%20jurnal%20ilmiah%20%20equity_sparta.pdf http://repository.ibs.ac.id/1774/ https://ejournal.upnvj.ac.id/index.php/equity |
Daftar Isi:
- This study aims to prove empirically the direct impact of the GCG mechanism on banking performance in Indonesia, the impact of the GCG mechanism on banking risk in Indonesia, the indirect impact of GCG mechanisms on banking performance in Indonesia by using intervening banking risk variables. The sample of this research is conventional banks registered on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2017 with sample 29 banks. The results of the study show that only the number of board of directors and the proportion of independent banking commissioners have a positive direct impact on banking performance. The size of the banking audit committee has a positive influence on the total risk and systematic risk of the banking system. The size of the board of commissioners of banks has a positive influence on the systematic risk of banking. The number of banking directors has a positive influence on systematic risk and has a negative influence on unsystematic risk banking. The proportion of independent commissioners has a significant negative effect on systematic risk and has a negative effect on unsystematic risk banking. The estimated total banking risk has a positive effect on banking performance. The estimation of unsystematic risk banking has a negative effect on banking performance. The results of this study have contribution for shareholders to improve the performance of banks by implementing good corporate governance. For regulators, this result has contribution for more selective selection of candidates for commissioners and independent commissioners